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ARGUMENT 
I. Grimes Has Failed to Articulate Any Truly Compelling Mitigation, and 
the District Court Erred When it Did Not Disbar Him for His 
Misappropriation 
There is substantial case law in this jurisdiction addressing the appropriate 
discipline an attorney should face in cases of misappropriation. That body of 
case law, which the OPC cited in its opening Brief, indicates that disbarment is 
the presumptive sanction for cases of attorney misappropriation. Appellant's Brief 
at 6-9. Grimes concurs with that position in his Brief. Appellee's Brief at 11. The 
question, then, is whether the district court based its departure from that 
presumption upon "truly compelling mitigation," which is the only standard this 
Court has set forth for cases of misappropriation. See In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 
111 (Utah 2001); In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998); and In re Babilis, 951 
P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The OPC asserts that the mitigation Grimes presents, 
while unfortunate, does not rise to the level of truly compelling mitigation, and the 
district court's downward departure from disbarment was in error. 
Much like in the Ennenga case, the district court in this matter found the 
correct level of discipline under the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
("Standards"), but then incorrectly used factors of mitigation to justify a downward 
departure from the presumption of disbarment. In Ennenga, this Court went 
through the offered mitigation and explained why the factors did not rise to the 
level of "truly compelling mitigation," required under Babilis. In re Ennenga, 2001 
UT at ffij 12-16. That analysis is required in this case as well. 
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Grimes argues that the factors of mitigation he presented were 
compelling, and were properly used by the district court to depart from the 
presumptive sanction of disbarment. Appellee's Brief at 13. The mitigation 
Grimes relies upon is detailed in the district court's Order of Sanction. R. 339-41. 
Even the district court, which heard and considered Grimes' mitigation first-hand, 
did not find that the mitigation constituted truly compelling mitigation. In the 
district court's Order of Sanction, the court lists the mitigating factors under Rule 
14-607(b) of the Standards immediately after acknowledging that this Court's 
guidance in these matters requires a showing of truly compelling mitigation to 
depart from a presumptive disbarment. Id. Interestingly, though the district court 
recognized that mitigation needed to reach the level of "truly compelling", the 
court did not state that any of the mitigation reached that level, and, as the OPC 
has argued, ultimately based its departure on an incorrect application of the 
Crawley case - not upon a finding that Grimes' mitigation was truly compelling. 
Grimes relies upon the following factors of mitigation: Absence of a prior 
record; inexperience in the practice of law; personal and emotional problems; 
good character or reputation; interim reform; and, remorse. Appellee's Brief at 
13-15. Grimes details his personal and financial problems, and suggests that 
these pressures exacerbated the underlying misconduct, /of. This Court, however, 
has roundly rejected the notion that personal or financial problems rise to the 
level of truly compelling mitigation in misappropriation cases. In Ennenga, the 
Court stated: 
2 
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The trial court also concluded that Ennenga's 'personal and emotional 
problems [resulting from] his inability to meet his regular financial 
obligations' were mitigating factors. Although we understand that the 
pressure of not being able to meet one's financial obligations can be great, 
we cannot condone the taking of a client's money to resolve that problem, 
even with the intent to return their funds. Personal financial pressures 
cannot mitigate the offense of misappropriation. 
In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 at ^ 14. Grimes' statements regarding his personal 
and financial problems are unfortunate. It is easy to take a sympathetic view 
toward those issues, and the OPC believes that the district court adopted such a 
view. The interests of justice, however, outweigh the sympathy that the district 
court showed Grimes by reducing the presumptive sanction. Though the district 
court correctly acknowledged that the only way to justify the departure under this 
Court's prior guidance was to find truly compelling mitigation, the court never 
used that phrase when discussing Grimes' mitigation. The district court never 
referred to the mitigation as truly compelling, compelling or substantial, and in 
reading the court's Conclusion, it does not appear that the court used the 
Ennenga standard to justify the downward departure in Grimes' sanction. R. 341-
43. 
None of the mitigation rises to the level of truly compelling. Of all the 
mitigation, the personal and financial problems are probably the most significant, 
and this Court has clearly rejected those factors as rising to the level of truly 
compelling mitigation. Despite his arguments to the contrary, Grimes has not 
shown truly compelling mitigation, and the district court erred when it did not 
disbar Grimes.1 
A 
In fact, Grimes does not even refer to his mitigation as "truly compelling", and 
only refers to the mitigation as "compelling." Appellee's Brief at 13. 
3 
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Grimes also attempts to distinguish his case from other cases of 
misappropriation, and argues the he didn't take as much money, and his 
mitigation is more compelling, so the discipline should not be as severe. 
Appellee's Brief at 15-18. Again, the Court addressed a similar argument in 
Ennenga, and rejected comparisons as a basis for a downward departure. As the 
Court wrote, "the standard for departing from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment is a 'truly compelling' mitigating factor in the circumstances of 
Ennenga's case, not the comparative seriousness of other cases." In re 
Ennenga, 2001 UT 111 at U 16. Grimes has not been able to articulate a truly 
compelling mitigating factor. That is the test for a downwards departure in Utah 
misappropriation cases, and the showing cannot be made in this case. That 
Grimes took less money than other attorneys who were disbarred for their 
misappropriation is not a factor this Court has considered in the past, and should 
not be considered now. There isn't a specific dollar amount hurdle for 
misappropriation cases, nor should there be. The dishonesty of misappropriating 
five dollars from a client is the same as misappropriating thousands. Though the 
magnitude of the misappropriation changes from case to case, it is still based 
upon the same misconduct, which should not be tolerated in any amount. 
II. The District Court's Reliance Upon the Crawley Decision for A 
Misappropriation Case Was in Error 
Grimes argues that the district court properly used the Crawley decision 
as basis for departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Appellee's 
Brief at 21. As Grimes points out, the district court did state the "truly compelling 
mitigation test" before listing the mitigating factors in the Order of Sanction. Id. at 
4 
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2 I 22, As the OPC has argued, howevei , tl le < ::oi in It • j ic l i i ic t ac ti ialh ' i ise tl me t i i iiilh 
compelling test as the basis for the departure. Grimes acknowledges as much 
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mitigating factors only suggests that the court found them compelling. Id. at 22 
I his sugyeslimi is in >ullu mill •iml HI*1 ul't,, tinns. mil! IUlitM/n Dial fhn clisi 
court used the truly compelling test as a basis for the departure. Rather, the OPC 
asserts that the district court was swayed by sympathy for the respondent, and a 
misapplication of the Crawley decision. 
There is no dispute that the Crawley decision gives wide discretion to the 
distrir 
that the discretion encouraged under Crawley does not woik to undercut the 
clear guidar m II las pi c > ided iii i attorney misappropriation cases, In 
other words, even after Crawley, the "truly compelling mitigation" test is still the 
only standard by which a district court may properly deviate from a presumptive 
disbarment in a misappropriation case. 
It is important to keep in mind that in Crawley, the OPC asked this Court to 
ailopl ijunlHiiM11 .iflilfessiiiti whnrn pnikilinn M/UIIM IN tpptmpiMln in dlnntm, 
discipline cases In te Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44 (Utah 2007) at If * .. 
I ilK- i'nuil d*m|nmil |n instead explained that it was pleased with • ^ 
manner in which district courts used tlle flexibility iri tlle Standards to tailor 
sanctions to particular cases of misconduct /of. at fl 22. The Court found that in 
tl ie Crawley case, the district d ills disciR1 inn ,mrl uplmlil llm 
sanction, and well as in the Henderson case (combined with the Crawley case). 
5 
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Neither Crawley nor Henderson engaged in misappropriation, but Grimes argues 
that Crawley gave the district court the discretion to depart from this Court's 
guidance in misappropriation cases. The OPC disagrees. 
Nothing in the Crawley case suggests that it applies to, or undermines, the 
direction this Court has previously recited in cases of attorney misappropriation. 
The OPC asked the Court to provide guidance regarding the use of probationary 
periods, and the Court declined to do so. To use that declination to suggest that 
district courts no longer need to follow the test of "truly compelling mitigation" for 
misappropriation cases goes too far, and overstates the language the Court used 
in the Crawley case. There is not any language in the Crawley decision to 
indicate that the Court intended the case to upend the established test for 
sanctions in misappropriation cases; thus, the OPC believes that Crawley was 
improperly relied upon by the district court. We urge this Court to reaffirm the 
long line of cases which articulated the "truly compelling mitigation" test, and 
disbar Grimes for his misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
There is only one test in this jurisdiction which a district court may use to 
make a downward departure from presumptive disbarment in misappropriation 
cases. The district court referenced that test, but made no finding that Grimes 
had factors of mitigation which were truly compelling. It is sometimes easy in 
these cases to become sympathetic to the problems attorneys encounter in life. 
In many disciplinary cases those problems are properly considered mitigating 
factors, and district courts use them to craft sanctions which may help troubled 
6 
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attorneys resume practice. This case, however, presents a situation involving the 
most serious misconduct an attorney can commit: the misappropriation of client 
fill III 111' | | U " ( l | | I M ' i I I I I d S e S ill Ill | III II I 1 II ill Nil i l l lllllll I I MINI l i l t I l l lSCIf jhl l l l l I I I III lit 
may have in less serious cases. As unfortunate as the mitigation offered may be 
i t 
court erred by not disbarring Grimes. 
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Senior Counsel 
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